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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
NORMA LOIS COOPER,
Plaintiff and Respondent;
VS

FORESTERS UNDERWRITERS, INC., a
corporation,

APPELLANT'S
BRIEF
Case No. 7941

Defendant and Appellant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an action on an insurance policy issued
by the Appellant to Respondent on March 31, 1951,
which provides for certain medical, surgical and hospital benefits described in the policy (see Exhibit
attached to Complaint, Tr. 2). The case was heard
on a Motion for Summary Judgment, at which time
the following statement of facts was agreed to:
"The Plaintiff made application, paid her
first premium of six dollars, and was insured
by defendant on March 31, 1951. Monthly pay-
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ments of six dollars each were paid during each
of the months of May, June, July and August,
1951. Payment of six dollars was made on October 1, 1951. The accident occurred in the afternoon of October 31, 1951, and in the evening of
October 31, 1951, after the accident occurred
and after Defendant's office was closed, the
payment of twelve dollars was.made to an agent
of the Defendant at the home of the agent."
(Tr. 10 and 11.)
Based upon the foregoing the trial court granted
the motion of Respondent for summary judgment,
apparently upon the theory that the grace period
provided for in the policy did not expire until midnight of the day of the accident and the policy was
therefore in full force and effect at the time of the
accident.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I

THE POLICY HAD LAPSED, ACCORDING TO ITS TERMS, AT THE TIME OF THE
ACCIDENT.
II
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED AT NOON
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951.
III
FINDING OF FACT NO. 3 IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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ARGUMENT
Point No. III will not be argued separately, but
is included in the discussion under Points No. I and
II.
I

THE POLICY HAD LAPSED ACCORDING
TO ITS TERMS AT THE TIM-E OF THE ACCIDENT.
The policy contains the following provisions
(See Exhibit attached to Complaint, Tr. 2):
"This Certificate is dated and takes effect
March 31, 1951, in consideration of the statements and agreements made by the insured in
the application and the payment in advance of
$6.00 as the first premium, which maintains
this Certificate in force for one month from
its effective date. The payment in advance and
acceptance by the Company of p rem i u m s
monthly of $6.00 thereafter is required to keep
this Certificate in continuous effect. The Company's acceptance of the premiums will constitute its consent for renewal. All periods of insurance hereunder shall begin and end at twelve
o'clock noon, standard time, at the residence of
the insured.
"SECTION V. GRACE PERIOD. A grace
period of thirty-one (31) days will be allowed
for payment of any renewal premium during
which grace period the Certificate will remain
in full force."
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"SECTION VII. (3) No statement made
by the applicant for insurance not included
herein shall void the certificate or be used in
any legal proceeding hereunder. No agent has
authority to change this Certificate or to waive
any of its provisions. No change in this Certificate shall be valid unless approved by an executive officer of the organization and such approval be endorsed hereon."
_
" ( 4) If default be made in the payment of
the agreed premium for this Certificate, the
·subsequent acceptance of a premium by the Organization or by any of its duly authorized
agents shall reinstate the Certificate, but only
to cover accidental injury thereafter sustained
and such sickness as may begin more than ten
days after the date of such acceptance."
The policy provides for monthly "periods of insurance" which begin and end at noon on the last day
of each month, commencing March 31, 1951, andrequired the payment of a monthly permium of $6.00 to
keep the "certificate in continuous effect." The first
premium paid the policy to April 30, 1951, at noon,
and the premiums paid during the months of May,
June, July and August paid the policy to noon of the
last day of each of those months. The payment made
on October 1st was made on the last day of the grace
period and paid the policy to noon of September 30,
1951. The last "period of insurance" was from noon
September 30 to noon October 31. October having
31 days, the grace period corresponded with the
"period of insurance" and expired on October 31,
1951. The premium for this "period of insurance"
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was not paid during the grace period, therefore the
policy had lapsed at the time the accident occurred
in the afternoon of October 31, 1951. The payment
made in the evening of October 31st does not alter the
result for the reason that Section VII ( 4) of the policy provides for reinstatement "only to cover accidental injury thereafter sustained."
II
THE GRACE PERIOD EXPIRED AT NOON
ON OCTOBER 31, 1951.
The trial court apparently took the position that
the law does not recognize fractions of days and that
the grace period ran until midnight October 31,
1951. That the law does not take cognizance of fractions of days as a general rule is recognized. We
are also aware of Section 68-3-7 of the Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, which provides as follows:
"68-3-7. TIME, HOW COMPUTED.-The
time in which any act provided by law is to be
done is computed by excluding the first day and
including the last, unless the last is a holiday,
and then it also is excluded."
But the rule adopted by the trial court is a mere
legal fiction and subject to limitations as stated in
52 American Jurisprudence, Pages 340 an~ 341, as
follows:
"The general rule that the law knows no
fractions of a day is a mere legal fiction, and,
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like all other legal fictions, is allowed to operate
only in cases where it will promote right and
justice.
"And although the ends of justice never require that the law depart from the ordinary
rule and recognize a fraction of a day to defeat
the manifest intention of the parties, where the
parties to a contract stipulate for the performance of the contract by an agreed hour on a
certain day, the law in such case will take cognizance of the fractions of the day."
Perhaps the most common exception to the
above general rule in the field of insurance is found
in cases where the policy expires at a certain time
of day, such as in Mutual Benefit Health and Accident, vs. Kennedy, 140 Fed. 2d 24, where the policy
expired at noon on a certain day and it was held that
where the insured drowned two hours thereafter
there was no coverage. The same proposition is
found in Shankle, vs. Home Insurance Company of
New York, 133 S. W. 2d 289 (Tenn.) where the
policy provided for coverage from December 5, 1936,
to December 5, 1937, at Noon Standard Time, place
of issue, and it was held that an accident which occurred at 7:30 p.m. on December 5, 1937, was not
covered. The Court in the Shankle case observed that
the principle that the law knows no part of a day
has no application to a contract having a definite
hour for its expiration.
In the case at bar not only the hour of beginning, but also the hour of ending each ''period of
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insurance" is specifically set forth. There is no ambiguity in the wording of the provisions. Likewise,
the case at bar should be distinguished from one
where the policy provides for a definite hour of commencement on a certain day, but fails to specify a
definite hour of termination. The question for decision is whether the time specified in the policy as
to the beginning and ending of the uperiod of insurance" applies to the grace period, the grace period
not having such a specification. The wording of the
grace period provision is:
"A grace period of thirty-one (31) days will
be allowed . . . "
The trial court held that the grace period expired at midnight on October 31, 1951. This does
violence to the policy in that it allows 31Yz days of
grace instead of 31 as provided for therein. The
interpretation of Appellant is the only one consistent
with the terms of the policy.
There are a number of cases which have specifically held that the grace period, renewal period, etc.,
although not specifically limited as to hour, are limited by the other provisions of the policy. In the case
of Richardson, vs. American National Insurance
Company, 137 S. 370 (La.) the following are the
pertinent provisions of the policy:
"In co11sideration of the ... payment in advance of a policy fee of Two Dollars and a premium of $1.95 does hereby insure Thomas Rich-
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ardson, subject to all the conditions herein
contained and endorsed hereon, from 12:00
o'clock noon, standard time, of the day this contract is dated, until12 :00 o'clock noon, standard
time, of the 15th day of February, 1925, and
for such further periods, stated in the renewal
receipts, as the payment of the premium specified in said application will maintain this policy
and insurance in force, against death or dis1 y ... "
a b1.l·t
" ( 2) A period of five ( 5) days of grace is
allowed for the payment of any renewal premium, during which the policy shall be maintained in full force and effect in accordance
with .its terms, but if the payment of any renewal premium is made after the grace period
of the policy has expired neither the Insured nor
the Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover for
any accidental injury sustained between the
date of such expiration and 12:00 o'clock noon,
standard time, of the day following the date of
such renewal payment; or for any illness originating or death occurring before the expiration
of ten (10) days after the date of such renewal
payment.
" ( 3) If default be made in the payment of
the agreed premium for this policy, the subsequent acceptance of a premium by the Company
or by any of its duly authorized agents shall
reinstate the Policy, but only to cover accidental
injury thereafter sustained and such sickness
as may begin more than ten days after the date
of such acceptance."
The premium due at noon on February 15, 1929,
was not paid until February 22, 1929. The insured
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was fatally shot on February 20, 1929, at 4:45 p.m.
It was contended that inasmuch as the grace period
provision was not limited to noon that the insured
had until six p.m., or sunset of the last day to pay
the premium in accordance with a provision of the
Louisiana law. The Court held that the grace period
expired at noon of the last day. The language of the
Court is as follows :
"We conclude that, under both the common
law and the codal article, contracting parties
have the right to stipulate for the performance
of the con tract by an agreed hour on a certain
day and the law in such case will take cognizance of the fractions of the day.
"The argument of plaintiff's attorney is
predicated upon only a few words of the clauses
in question, which he attempts to isolate from
the language of the balance of the clause and
the other clauses in the policy. To accept this
interpretation would be to give the plaintiff not
only five days' grace, but five days, four hours,
and forty-five minutes. We do not believe that
this was contemplated by the parties and that
the language in question must be interpreted
in connection with the remainder of the clause
and also the other provisions of the policy~
which, as a whole, show that the policy commenced and ended at 12 o'clock noon, whether
it was terminated upon the expiration of the
term or tlpon the termination of a renewal period, or upon the termination of the grace period.
All of the periods of time in the policy are based
upon 12 o'clock noon. We find no uncertainty
or ambiguity or conject11re in the language of
the policy on this point."
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Orlando, vs. Rosen, 290 N. Y. S. 270. This case
involved a workmen's compensation policy which was
written to expire on November 11, 1934, at 12:01
a.m. By a rider attached, the policy was extended
for a period of one month to expire on December 11,
1934. The rider contains the following provision:
"Subject otherwise to all terms, limitations and conditions of the policy to which this endorsement is
attached." The claimant was injured at two p.m. on
December 11, 1934. It was held that the policy had
expired some hours earlier that day.
Purvis, vs. Commercial Casualty Co., 159 S. E.
369 (S.C.) (1931). The defendant insured Jack W.
Purvis "for the term of twelve months from the 3rd
day of September, 1928, from Noon Standard Time"
against loss or disability or death from accidental
means. On September 3, 1929, about five o'clock in
the afternoon Purvis was fatally injured. The Court
held that the policy had lapsed at the time of the injury and stated as follows:
"In the case at bar, the parties stipulated in
the contract, as was their right, that the insurance should be for a term of twelve months,
beginning at noon of September 3, 1928; in view
of the fact that the insured was fatally injured
a few hours after noon of September 3, 1929,
it would be an injustice to the insurer for the
court to hold, nothing else appearing, that the
insurance was in force during the whole of that
day."
The Plaintiff contended that a receipt book issued by the company contained a notation that the
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premium must be paid on or before September 3,
1929, and that by reason of there being no limitations as to time of day when the premium should be
paid that the insured had the entire day to make
payment thereof. In discussing this point, however,
the Court said:
"The receipt book contains notice that such
· premium must be paid on or before Setpember
3, 1929. The policy indicates that it was the
clear intent of the parties that the insurance
should expire at 12 o'clock noon September 3,
1929. There is nothing in the receipt book to
indicate a contrary intention; the notice that
the renewal premium must be p.aid on or before
September 3, 1929, merely meaning, in connection with the provisions of the policy, that,
jf payment should be deferred until that date,
it must be made by 12 o'clock noon. It being
conceded that the renewal premium was not
paid by or before 12 o'clock noon of September
3, and that the insured received his injuries
some hours thereafter, it is clear that the policy
was not in force at the time of the fatal accident.''
In the case of Troy Automobile Exchange, vs.
Home Insurance Company, 103 Misc. Rep. 331, 169
N.Y. S. 796,. 798, the policy ran from one date certain
at noon to another date certain at noon. The period
covered by a renewal certificate which ran from the
30th of one month to the 30th of another was involved. In the Troy case the insurance company tried
to avoid liability for loss of a car that was stolen
on August 30, 1913, on the theory that August 30th
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was excluded by the renewal certificate. The Court,
however, held that the period of renewal ran from
noon on August 30th to noon on September 30th:
"The defendant, however, insists that the insurance kept in force by certificate No. 10 runs
from August 30, to September 30, 1931, and
therefore, admitting the date of the theft to be
August 30th, it is not included within the term
of the contract, because the word 'from' would
not include August 30th, or any part thereof,
but would begin the next day; but the certificate
must be construed in the light of the policy
under which it was issued, and, reading both
together as we must, it is clear that the insurance was from noon of the 30th of August to
noon of the 30th of September."
Our search has not revealed a U tab case exactly
in point on the facts. However, Fawcett, vs. Security
Benefit Association, 99 Utah 193, 104 Pac. 2d 214,
218, is a case involving the construction of an insurance contract and the principle of construction therein adopted is determinative of the question involved
in the case at bar. The language of the Court is:
"Since such provision of the certificate is not
so clear as to be susceptible of but one construction, we must determine which of the permissible interpretations thereof is consistent
with the other provisions of the entire agreement. Even though a particular provision of a
contract of insurance be susceptible of more
than one meaning, the construction of such provision more favorable to the assured will not
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be adopted if other provisions of the entire contract clearly resolve the ambiguity in favor of
the contrary construction."
There is no ambiguity in the contract in the case
at bar. The t:rial court went beyond and outside the
contract and adopted a legal fiction contrary to its
terms. The contract can not be rendered ambiguous
by a strained misapplication of a legal fiction. In
the Fawcett case, where the contract itself was susceptible of more than one meaning, this Court adopted the interpretation consistent with the other provisions of the entire contract. In the case at bar,
where an alternative interpretation is made possible
only by a legal fiction, this Court is bound to follow
the holding in the Fawcett case and adopt the interpretation which is consistent with the entire provisions of the contract.
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed and the Complaint dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
-- .. -.................... ·--.... -- ...... --- ..... -....... -.---- .... -.............. -- .. -- ..... ---·- .

OF ROMNEY AND BOYER

Attorneys for Appellant
1409 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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